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Technocracy and Thaksinocracy in Thailand:  
Reforms of the Public Sector and the Budget System  
under the Thaksin Government
Suehiro Akira*
Thaksin Shinawatra seized power in 2001 and then was exiled from Thailand after 
the military coup d’etat in September 2006.  He himself is still the focal point of 
serious political conflict taking place in contemporary Thailand.  He has always been 
attacked by anti-Thaksin groups on account of the following reasons: extreme power 
concentration, the political style of Thaksinocracy, nepotism, corruption, and popu-
lism in favor of rural people.  However, very few scholars have focused on his 
political and social reforms which aimed at modernizing the Kingdom of Thailand in 
order to reorganize the country into a strong state.
This article seeks to clarify the characteristics of the Thaksin government as 
a “destructive creator” of existing power structure and traditional bureaucracy.  The 
article offers a brief discussion of Thaksin’s populist policies such as village funds, 
30 baht medical services, and one tambon one product (OTOP) project, and then 
explores the background of, the process behind, and the policy results of two major 
reforms undertaken by the Thaksin government in the public sector (bureaucracy) 
and the budget system.  These reforms appear to have transformed Thailand from 
a traditional bureaucratic polity into a modern state in conjunction with an emerging 
middle-income country in the global capitalism.  But Thaksin’s ambitious reforms 
ultimately collapsed because they were too radical and too speedy for all the people, 
including royalists, the military, government officers, as well as conservatives.
Keywords: Thailand, Thaksinocracy, political reform, public sector, the budget 
system, bureaucracy, populism, strong state
Introduction
In September 2006, a military coup d’etat toppled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 
five-and-a-half-year-old government.  The Temporary Constitution dated October 1 
claimed the following as the reason for the coup:




The head of the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy which seized 
power successfully on 19 September 2006, informed the king that the reasons for seizing power 
and abrogating the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand were to correct the deterioration in 
the government of the realm, and inefficiency in managing the government of the realm and mon-
itoring the use of state power, which caused widespread corruption and malfeasance, for which 
those responsible could not be brought to account.  This brought about a serious crisis of politics 
and government, and problems of conflict among the mass of the people who were aroused to such 
divisive partisanship that the unity and harmony among the people of the nation collapsed into a 
severe social crisis.1)
Likewise, the mass media of Thailand criticized Thaksin’s management of the state 
on the grounds that he had provoked a serious national crisis owing to the concentration 
of power, prevalence of nepotism, wide-ranging corruption, and destruction of democracy 
under his watch (Nariphon 2006; Wichai 2006).  However, viewing the military coup 
simply as the result of a conflict between the movement of democratization and Thaksin’s 
dictatorship, and a product of popular protest against a corrupt government does not offer 
an adequate understanding of why the coup happened as well as an insightful analysis 
of fundamental problems facing contemporary Thailand under the strong pressures of 
globalization and economic liberalization (Suehiro 2009).
After the 2006 coup, Thailand has suffered continuous political instability due to the 
conflict between the pro-Thaksin group or red shirts group and the anti-Thaksin group 
or yellow shirts group.  For the past six years from 2007 to 2012, analyses of Thai politics 
and society have significantly deepened.  Those who focused on the sharp conflict 
between the red shirts group and the yellow shirts group began to turn their attention 
to more fundamental problems rooted in Thai society, namely, the widening gap in income 
and assets among the people (not poverty problems), and the basic conflict between the 
mass people (lower-income class) and the traditional ruling elites (royalists, military, 
bureaucrats, and capitalists) (Montesano et al. 2012).  However, these arguments fail to 
provide explanation of the real cause of the military coup in 2006.  More importantly, 
they fail to provide a comprehensive explanation of the impact of Thaksin’s reforms on 
Thai politics and society.  Given this situation, we still need to explain the real cause of 
the military coup as well as the total picture of reforms undertaken by Thaksin.
My hypothesis in this article is very simple.  The real cause of the military coup is 
the conflict between Thaksin, on the one hand, who forcibly conducted reforms of the 
state, and royalist-military groups, on the other hand, who believed that his state reforms 
constituted a serious threat to the monarchy.  At the same time, government officials and 
people have been apprehensive about the outcomes of Thaksin’s intensive reforms 
1) Text is quoted from a provisional English translation by Pasuk and Baker (2007).
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because these reforms were undertaken too speedily and too radically in the context of 
Thai social values, which preferred gradual reform towards a democratized country over 
a big-bang style reform towards an advanced country.  This is the most important reason 
why the majority of the people including the people in rural areas temporarily welcomed 
or accepted the military coup, at least in its initial stage.2)
We should not overlook the fact that Thaksin was Janus-faced in his style of state 
management: he presented himself as an ambitious populist3) as well as an active state 
reformist.  These two faces exactly correspond to two world-wide movements during the 
1990s: the political movement for democratization and the economic movement for glob-
alization and liberalization.  As Tamada cogently pointed out, the 1997 Constitution was 
a direct product of the democratization movement after the May 1992 bloody incident, 
or Phrusapa Thamin, in Thailand.  Ironically, the 1997 Constitution also created a “strong 
prime minister” like Thaksin Shinawatra through changes in general election system, 
new regulations on the activities of political parties, increased authority of prime minis-
ter, and elimination of parliament members from cabinet members (Tamada 2005; 
Tamada and Funatsu 2008).
It was the enhanced executive power of Thaksin that enabled him to implement his 
populist policies, and in turn contributed to his great popularity among the people.  On 
this account, many scholars including anti-Thaksin group and mass media have frequently 
analyzed Thaksin’s management of the state by focusing on his populist-oriented policies 
such as village funds, people’s banks, one tambon (village) one product movement or 
OTOP, and 30-baht universal health services (Worawan 2003).4)  But these projects are 
only one part of his overall policy objectives, and populist-oriented policies have reduced 
importance in his reform efforts after February 2005, when a ruling party of Thai Rak 
Thai or TRT won 377 out of the total 500 seats in the House of Representatives in the 
general election.
Thaksin’s second face, that of a state reformist, revealed itself in 2005.  Indeed, he 
attempted to remake the Kingdom of Thailand into a modernized state that would survive 
2) According to the survey of the Assumption Business Administration College or ABAC in October 
2006, 71% of the people were in favor of the Surayud Julanonda temporary government.  However, 
slow-paced response to rural people’s problems eroded popular support for the new government 
and support, which quickly dropped to 35% in February 2007.  See Pasuk and Baker (2009) and 
Suehiro (2009, Ch. 6).
3) “An ambitious populist” here implies another king as great father of a country, who provides support 
to all the people with great mercy.  Nidhi analyzes the presence of Thaksin as a competitor to the 
king in the context of Thai political culture of the patrimonial state (Nidhi 2006).
4) For more detailed study on backgrounds and the progress of 30-baht universal health services in 
reference to the reformist groups in the Ministry of Public Health, see Kawamori (2009).
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the world-wide waves of globalization, economic liberalization, and IT revolution.  In his 
eyes, old-fashioned management of the state would isolate Thailand from global capital-
ism.  An economically advanced country needs to reform its institutions, practices, and 
social values in line with the new international circumstances, just as a modern corpora-
tion needs to reform its management in keeping with the times (Pran 2004, Vol. 1;  Suehiro 
2009, Ch. 5).
Such assumptions are apparent in his Kingdom of Thailand Modernization Frame-
work or the KTMF.  KTMF was addressed to foreign and domestic investors who were 
present at the prime minister’s residence in December 2005, and provided detailed infor-
mation on the Mega Projects amounting to 1,800 billion baht (Shukan Tai Keizai, January 
30, 2006).  Interestingly, Thaksin also used other key words such as knowledge, technol-
ogy, management, and finance to explain the KTMF.  The major obstacles to the KTMF, 
in Thaksin’s view, are the old-fashioned public sector and the conservative culture of 
government officials (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 300–301).5)  Consequently, his reforms were 
naturally directed at the public sector (Thai-style bureaucracy) and the budget system 
under the control of the bureaucracy.  He aimed to fill the gap between the economic 
status of Thailand as a middle-income country and her poor-performing institutions which 
had failed to ride the new wave of international movements.
This article aims to clarify the changes in Thai bureaucracy and technocracy under 
the Thaksin government (between February 2001 and September 2006) in particular the 
effort to transform Thai bureaucracy into Thaksinocracy (Thaksinathipatai) rather than 
democracy (Prachathipatai) by answering the following questions: what were the major 
characteristics of Thaksin’s style of state management or Thaksinomics (section II)? how 
has Thaksin changed the mechanism of decision-making in order to reform the Kingdom 
of Thailand (section III)? what kind of socio-economic policies were introduced (section 
IV)? how did Thaksin view the traditional bureaucracy and how did he reform the public 
sector (section V)? how did he change the budget system to promote his strategic agenda 
(section VI)? and finally, what were the results of his drastic reforms (section VII)? 
Through these arguments and the follow-up of the political turmoil after the 2006 coup, 
I explore the essence of Thaksinomics and Thaksinocracy rather than provide mere 
criticism of his arbitrary use of state power.
5) Concerning the collection of speeches of Thaksin, a lot of books are available.  Among them, three 
volume books edited by Pran Phisit-setthakan (2004) are the best ones, which consist of Vol. 1 
(Thaksinomics and a CEO Country), Vol. 2 (Thaksin and Social Policies), and Vol. 3 (Thaksin as a 
Leader in Asia and the World).
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What is a Thaksinomics?
Three Elements of Thaksinomics
Originally, “Thaksinomics” is a term employed by the mass media and scholars to criti-
cize Thaksin Shinawatra’s political style.  But after 2003, Thaksin himself also began to 
employ this term in his speeches to express his own political thought as well as his 
strategy of “dual-track policies” (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 26–38).  Based on my observations, 
Thaksinomics consists of three major elements: 1) a corporate approach to management 
of the state; 2) a strategic approach to reform of public services as encoded by the slogan, 
“vision, mission, and goal”; and 3) a dual approach to revitalize Thai economy and society, 
or so-called “dual-track policies” (nayobai khuap-khu).
First of all, Thaksin has frequently and publicly expressed his idea that “a state is a 
company, and a prime minister is a CEO of country” (ibid., 223–233; Pasuk and Baker 
2004, 101).  The CEO or Chief Executive Officer is the supreme person who is essen-
tially empowered to appoint a top managerial class and to make the final decisions in 
operating a company.  Following this concept, Thaksin envisioned the prime minister 
position as unchallenged leadership in state management.  In the same way, he expected 
a minister to be the CEO of his or her respective Ministry, a governor to be CEO of a 
province (phu-wa CEO), and an ambassador to be CEO of an embassy (Thut CEO), and 
so on.6)
His idea seems to have percolated from his own experience as the top leader who 
controlled the Shin Group, the largest business empire of the telecommunications indus-
try in Thailand.7)  He also borrowed his idea from the arguments of Somkid Jatusripitak, 
a professor of National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), as laid out in 
his remarkable papers on “Thailand Company” as well as “A Leader in the Future” 
(Somkid 2001, 76–80; Wirat 2001).  Thanks to these ideas, Somkid served as one of the 
key members of the TRT executive committee, and was later appointed Finance Minis-
ter when Thaksin set up his first government in February 2001.
Second, Thaksin ordered all the government agencies including public schools and 
hospitals to clarify their own “vision, mission, goal” (wisaithat, na-thi, paomai) in refer-
ence to their tasks for the people.  He requested this clarification at each level of govern-
6) Thaksin himself defined the CEO system as a system of moderator, or rabop chaophap (Pran 2004, 
Vol. 1, 294–295) or a system of integrator of organizations, or phu-wa buranakarn (ibid., Vol. 2, 
223–233).
7) For a detailed account of the development of Thaksin’s business activities, see Sorakon (1993), 
Suehiro (1995; 2006, Ch. 4), Athiwat (2003), and Pasuk and Baker (2004, Ch. 2).
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ment agencies from ministerial level through departmental and divisional levels, and 
finally to the individual level.  At the same time, they are all subject to performance 
evaluation by both internal bodies and third-party team in reference to the initial targets 
of each group.  Analogous to a company management, strategy and competition were 
deemed by Thaksin as essential instruments for improving public services, and therefore 
he claimed a strategic approach rather than experience-based practices.
Third, he introduced the new agenda of dual-track policies, which aimed at pro-
moting a grass-roots economy (setthakit rak-ya) in rural areas on the one hand, and 
enhancing international competitiveness among big firms in urban area on the other.8) 
What is unique about Thaksin’s policies is that the main purpose for promoting the 
grass-roots economy is not to reduce poverty in rural areas (the traditional style poli-
tics of clemency and charity), but to give chances or opportunities for rural people to 
 create their own business and employment (a new style politics in the era of the global 
capitalism).
In this context, Thaksin promoted “community business” (thurakit chumchon) 
through programs of village funds, people’s bank, and OTOP movement, which adopted 
an approach to tackling poverty that was quite different from that adopted by previous 
governments.  Promotion of the grass-roots economy also aimed to court votes in rural 
areas in favor of TRT in the next election (February 2005).  This is the precise reason 
why Thaksin emphasized populist-oriented policies in his first government between 2001 
and 2004.
Criticism of Thaksinocracy
The above three elements combine with each other to characterize the Thaksinomics. 
However, Thaksin’s political style was attacked by mass media and academic circles 
for leading to “policy corruption” (Pasuk and Baker 2004), “prime ministerialization” 
 (Bhidhaya 2004), “Thaksinocracy” (Thaksinathipatai) against democracy (Rungsan 
2005), “Thaksinization of Thailand” (McCargo and Ukrist 2005), “Thaksin regime” (rabop 
 Thaksin) (Nariphon 2006), and new nepotism or revival of family politics.  Three aspects 
of these criticisms are worth noting.
Firstly, they criticized Thaksin’s politics for being a “business of politics” (Pasuk 
and Baker 2004; 2009).  Although Thaksin did not directly involve himself in illegal 
activities, he was criticized on the grounds that he depended heavily on money rather 
than the traditional Thai idea of justice or “thamma.”
8) The objectives of dual-track policies were explained by Thaksin himself in his speech in Manila, the 
Philippines, on September 8, 2003 (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 26–38).
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Secondly, many scholars also criticized the increasing concentration of power under 
his term as well as his dictatorial behavior.  For example, Rungsan Thanaphonphan 
argued that while a CEO in a company was usually supervised and monitored by both the 
board of directors and shareholders, Thaksin did not brook any criticism from the outside. 
Accordingly, he was not a CEO of state in a real sense, but a one-man-show type of taoke 
(owner-operator) of the state (Rungsan 2005, 168–175).
Finally, they criticized Thaksin’s politics for reviving nepotism.  As a matter of fact, 
Thaksin appointed a lot of family members to key posts: his younger sister Yaowaret 
became chairperson of the National Women Association; another younger sister Yaopa 
was the clique leader of TRT; Somchai Wongsawat, Yaopa’s husband, was appointed 
permanent secretary of Justice and the prime minister (September–December 2008); 
and Priaopan Damapong, his wife’s elder brother, was given the number-two position at 
the National Police Office.9)  Thaksin also appointed two cousins (Chaiyasit and Uthai) to 
the key posts of Army Commander-in-Chief and the permanent secretary of Defense, 
respectively (Athiwat 2003; Tamada 2005).  It is fair to say that such nepotism in person-
nel management contributed to fueling anti-Thaksin sentiments among the military group 
as well as among the middle classes in the Bangkok Metropolitan area.
Economic Performance of the Thaksin Government
Before looking at the socio-economic policies of the Thaksin government, let me review 
briefly the economic performance of Thailand.  Table 1 compares the targets of Ninth 
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (2001–2006) formulated by the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and actual figures in par-
ticular targets.  Table 1’s actual figures concerning economic growth rate, inflation, fiscal 
balance, and job creation show that the Thai economy was performing better than NES-
DB’s forecasts and targets.  Contrary to pessimistic projection by Thai economists on 
growth rates (2–2.5%), Thailand had achieved over 5% growth since 2002.  Such eco-
nomic recovery from the crisis in 1997 has contributed not only to rapid increase of 
private consumption but also to the nation-wide support of the people in favor of Thaksin 
and TRT.10)
Two characteristics distinguish the Thaksin government’s management of macro-
9) In August 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of Thaksin, was appointed a prime min-
ister owing to a victory of pro-Thaksin political party in a general election of July 2011.
10) Increase of private consumption can be attributed partially to rapid growth of consumer’s credit 
(mini bubble economy) in the period of the Thaksin administration.  Indeed, outstanding consumer’s 
credit doubled, from 72.5 billion baht in the end of 2002 to 143.5 billion baht at the end of 2005 (Bank 
of Thailand website).
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economy compared with previous governments.  First, Thaksin attempted to reduce 
public external debt and its ratio to nominal GDP, and obtain budget resources from the 
national revenue, profits of state enterprises, profits from privatization of state enter-
prises, and private investments.  In spite of the fact that the NESDB projected public 
debt ratio against nominal GDP as 60% and over in the Ninth Five-Year Plan and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) requested recipient countries to meet 55% as the 
maximum standard, Thailand had successfully reduced this figure to less than 50% by 
2003.  When Thaksin operated his own private business (Shin Corp.), he preferred direct 
corporate finance based on issuance of stocks and corporate bonds to indirect corporate 
finance based on banking loans.  In exact accordance with the strategy of corporate 
finance, Thaksin insisted on applying the principle of non-borrowing or stand-alone 
approach to the financial and fiscal management of a state.
Second, there was an increase in state revenue, which was by far larger than initially 
estimated.  After the currency crisis in 1997, state revenue had dramatically dropped, 
and the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of the Budget were naturally inclined to adopt 
conservative stance in estimating national revenue.  They therefore tried to control 
budget allocation in conjunction with conservative revenue projection.  After the eco-
nomic recovery, however, actual revenue has always exceeded initial estimates, and in 
Table 1 Targets of the Ninth Five-Year Plan and Actual Performance, 2001–04
Items Units
Targets of  
the Ninth  
Plan
Actual Figures 
 under the Thaksin Administration
2001 2002 2003 2004
GDP nominal Billion baht – 5,135.5 5,446.0 5,930.4 6,576.8
GDP actual growth rate % 4.0~5.0 2.2 5.3 7.0 6.2
Current accounts Billion baht – 6.2 7.0 8.0 7.3
Current accounts/GDP % 1.0~2.0 5.4 5.5 5.6 4.5
Consumers’ price % 3.0 1.6 0.7 1.8 2.7
Fiscal balance Billion baht – – –150.4 –40.8 –69.7
Fiscal balance/GDP % –1.0~–1.5 – –2.8 –0.7 –1.1
Public debt Billion baht – 2,900.3 2,930.8 2,902.4 3,120.8
Public debt/GDP % 60.0~62.0 56.5 53.8 48.9 47.8
Public debt/ 
Budget expenditure % 16.0~18.0 10.9 11.3 12.5 11.6
Employed persons 1,000 persons – 32,137 32,997 33,815 34,850
Additional employed 1,000 persons 230 880 824 817 1,035
Source: Made by the author on the basis of NESDB (2005, 1/4).
Notes: 1) The ninth plan was authorized at the cabinet meeting in September 2001.
2) Growth rates for 2003 (6.9%→7.0%) and 2004 (6.1%→6.2%) were replaced by latest ones.
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turn granted additional budget resources to the Thaksin government.11)
Additional revenue came from an increase in collection of corporate taxes, value 
added taxes, and excise taxes owing to economic recovery during the term of the  Thaksin 
government.  Along with the increase in tax revenues, an equally important development 
was the computerization of the state revenue collection system, which not only helped 
speed up tax collection procedures but also minimized unintentional failure in tax collec-
tion in the fields of excise taxes and value-added taxes.  Additional revenues were sepa-
rated from the ordinary proceeding of budget allocation and were eventually placed under 
the direct control of the cabinet, in other words the prime minister.  Such free-hand 
revenue naturally became significant fiscal sources for the Thaksin government to pro-
mote money-consuming populist-oriented policies.  I will return to this problem in section 
VI of this article.
Changes in Policy-Making Process
Four Core Economic Agencies and Technocrats
After seizing political power, Thaksin significantly changed the process of policy-making. 
To clarify the difference in policy-making process between the Thaksin government and 
previous ones, let me briefly review the role of major economic agencies engaged in 
formulating and implementing macro-economic policies in Thailand.12)
As Warr and Bhanupong have already argued, there are four core economic agencies 
in Thailand: the National Economic and Social Development Board or NESDB, which is 
the government’s main economic planning agency; the Fiscal Policy Office or FPO of the 
Ministry of Finance for the management of public finance; the Bureau of the Budget or 
BOB of the Prime Minister Office for the estimation of state revenue; and the Bank of 
Thailand or BOT for financial arrangement (Warr and Bhanupong 1996, 69–70; see Fig. 
1 in Suehiro 2005, 17).
These four core agencies have played a preeminent role in the process of national 
budget allocation since the 1960s, and have been fully responsible for the stable develop-
ment of the macro-economy.  The NESDB principally screens the bottom-up investment 
plans of each ministry and department in reference to the targets of the Five-Year Plans, 
11) Additional state revenue amounted to 48 billion baht in FY 2002, 146 billion baht in FY 2003, and 
89 billion baht in FY 2004, respectively.  Original estimated revenue in each year was around 1,000 
billion baht, and then surplus accounted for 5% to 15% of the total (See Table 7 of this article).
12) For more information on the decision-making process of economic policies in Thailand, see Muscat 
(1994), Warr and Bhanupong (1996), Suehiro and Higashi (2000, Ch. 1), and Suehiro (2005).
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while the BOB investigates revenue aspects.  The FPO proposes the possible govern-
ment expenditure, consistent with the monetary policy of the BOT.  The four core agen-
cies have traditionally cooperated with each other through their personal networks under 
the leadership of the distinguished governor of the BOT, Dr. Puey Ungpakorn, and have 
maintained their policy independence from the political influences of military forces 
 (Suehiro 2005, 22–28).
When Thailand experienced long-term economic recession in the early 1980s, the 
interrelationship among the four core agencies changed.  Since the Prem Tinsulanond 
government applied for standby credit from the IMF and structural adjustment loans 
(SALs) from the World Bank between 1981 and 1983, the NESDB and the FPO began to 
play more important roles in managing and monitoring public external debt from these 
international organizations (Muscat 1994, Ch. 5).  In addition to the expanded role of the 
two agencies, the Prem government also established three important institutions to 
implement macro-economic policies.  These three are the National Public Debt Com-
mittee chaired by the finance minister; the Economic Ministers Meetings, which exclu-
sively discussed economic matters before the regular cabinet meeting; and the Joint 
Public and Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCCs, or Kho.Ro.Oo.) to argue 
jointly current economic problems (Anek 1992, Ch. 4; Suehiro 2005, 32–35).  At the same 
time, the NESDB was expected to serve as a coordinating organ for these national com-
mittees in addition to its original task of planning the Five-Year Plan.
When Chatichai Choonhavan (Chart Thai Party) won the 1988 election, he estab-
lished the first political party-based coalition government in Thailand.  But he hardly 
changed the existing policy-making system.  It is true that the Finance Minister was not 
appointed any more from qualified persons of the Ministry of Finance, but was picked 
from the ruling political party.  And the Finance Minister sometimes intervened in both 
fiscal policies of the FPO and monetary policies of the BOT (Suehiro 2005, 37–39; Apichat 
2002).  But there was no noticeable change in the process of policy-making.  Technocrats 
at the four core agencies could still continue to manage macro-economy as long as they 
did not touch on the sensitive business interests of political party leaders and royalist 
members.
Changes in the Chuan Government: Politics of Public Hearings
The currency crisis of 1997, however, changed the roles of the four core agencies.  The 
major developments in economic policy-making under the second Chuan government 
(1997–2000) may be summarized as follows.
First of all, since the government decided to request standby credits from the IMF 
and SALs from the World Bank to overcome the crisis, the two international financial 
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organizations came to play a decisive role in formulating the economic reforms of 
 Thailand.
Second, the Finance Minister, Tarrin Nimmanhaeminda, was given supreme power 
to control the financial sector and to negotiate with international financial organizations 
as well as Japanese government agencies.13)  Tarrin was the key person of the Democrat 
Party, which was the ruling party of coalition government, and was former president of 
the Siam Commercial Bank.
Third, the policy role of the FPO was diminished, in comparison with its role in the 
era of the Prem government.  The Public External Debt Section was separated from the 
FPO to independently handle the growing loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and 
Japanese government.  Along with this organizational restructuring and transfer of  several 
sections, the number of FPO staff was cut from 250 to 150 by 1999.  Instead, the Economic 
Ministers Meetings began to play more important roles.  The meetings which were held 
every Monday ahead of the Tuesday cabinet meeting eventually made the final decisions 
on economic matters (Suehiro 2005, 44).
Fourth, the Chuan government increased the number of the Deputy Minister (Phu 
chuai rattamontri-wa) from 8 to 24 persons in addition to 4 Deputy Prime Ministers and 
13 ministers in order to invite influential political party members into the coalition 
govern ment.14)  The posts of the Deputy Ministers in several ministries such as the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications were very attractive for party leaders seek-
ing political rents.
Finally, the Chuan government placed importance on public hearings in the process 
of formulating nation-wide policies such as a Five-Year Plan, the Social Investment Fund 
(SIF), and the Industrial Restructuring Plan (IRP).  This policy is due in part to the ide-
ology of the 1997 Constitution which aimed at promoting people’s participation in politics 
and in part to the political agenda of the Democrat Party which promised further democ-
ratization in Thailand (Suehiro 2000).  Patcharee Siroros of Thammasat University has 
characterized the Chuan government’s politics as a “politics of public hearings.”15)
In brief, the major players in economic policy-making diversified into four groups: 
1) international financial organizations (IMF and the World Bank); 2) economic techno-
13) After the currency crisis, Japanese government provided a huge amount of credits through the 
Miyazawa Plan and extra yen credits between 1998 and 1999 (Suehiro 2009, 64–65).
14) The total number of cabinet members accounted for 26 to 44 persons between 1973 and 1990, while 
deputy ministers accounted for 12 to 21 persons in corresponding period.  The Anant government 
in 1992 reduced its members to 26 persons and 8 persons respectively due to the nature of tempo-
rary government after the May bloody incidents in 1992.
15) Author’s interview with Patcharee Siroros in Bangkok, February 1999.
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crats in the NESDB and the Ministry of Finance; 3) particular political party leaders in 
the positions of the finance minister, industry minister, and the deputy ministers in 
economic affairs; and 4) participants in the public hearings.  Each group was inclined to 
seek its own interest without mutual cooperation and policy consistency.  Such fragmen-
tation of decision-making became the object of Thaksin’s criticisms, which targeted the 
structural weakness of the Thai public sector.
Thaksinocracy in Policy-Making: Prime Ministerialization
The Thaksin government appeared to have aimed at completely changing the traditional 
policy-making system, despite the carryover of human resources from the Chatichai 
governments.16)  The new institutional elements may be summarized as follows.
First, Thaksin abolished the regular meetings of the Economic Ministers on Mon-
day, and replaced them with the meetings of the Strategy Committee17) to argue national 
urgent matters.  The Committee reportedly consisted of Thaksin himself and leading 
figures from the Army, the National Police Office, and business circle, but there is no 
precise information on its membership.
Second, he set up the five Screening Committees (later increased to seven ones) at 
the first cabinet meeting on March 6, 2001, and appointed five Deputy Prime Ministers 
as chairpersons of each committee to examine particular policy issues.  Important policy 
proposals from responsible ministries including the NESDB were first submitted to these 
committees, and then discussed before final decisions were reached at the cabinet  meetings.
Third, he abolished the public hearings, and replaced them with the practice of direct 
dialogue with the people through his own speeches at the government-sponsored radio 
(FM 92.5) every Saturday from 8:00 to 8:30 pm.  Between April 28, 2001 and August 19, 
2006, his radio speeches continued to convey his political thought along with explanations 
of decisions of cabinet meetings.18)  Thaksin appears to have put more importance on 
such type of direct dialogue with the people rather than on time-consuming discussion 
in the House of Representatives.
Fourth, he appointed TRT members as the Vice Ministers (Rong rattamontri-wa, 
16) Such key persons in the Thaksin government include Pansak Vinyaratn (prime minister’s advisor), 
Vishnu Krua-ngam (chairman of the Public Sector Development Commission), and Kittidej Sutsu-
korn (advisor to the Industry Minister), who came from policy advisory team of the Chatichai 
government (Nakharin 2008).
17) The full name of the committee is the Committee on Strategies and Tactics to Solve National Urgent 
Problems.
18) All of Thaksin’s speeches at the radio broadcasting until 2003 are edited and included in Supawan 
(2003).  This style of direct dialogue with the people was adopted by the Samak government and 
the Abhisit government (on TV).
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non-cabinet members), in addition to the Deputy Ministers (Phu chuai rattamontri-wa, 
cabinet members) because the 1997 Constitution strictly regulated the number of cabinet 
members (reduced from 47 to 36 persons).  The Thaksin government is the first one to 
be elected under the 1997 Constitution.  To overcome limitations to the number of 
cabinet members, he created the new post of Vice Minister and appointed influential TRT 
party members to this post to supervise ministers and technocrats.  It is reported that 
he obtained this idea from the Japanese system of having parliamentary vice ministers 
(seimu-jikan).19)
Institutional reform in policy-making system contributed to the strong leadership 
of the prime minister.  This movement is clearly evident in Table 2, which compares the 
distribution of cases of policy submissions to the cabinet meetings in two periods of the 
Chuan government and the Thaksin government.  Computing the average frequency of 
policy submissions to the cabinet meeting per month, we see that the Thaksin govern-
ment tackled more cases (100.8 cases against 95.3 cases).  And the role of the Prime 
Minister Office increased in the Thaksin government (19.1% against 17.6%).  But the 
differences in these figures are not so impressive.  Rather we should note the differences 
in major agencies responsible for submitting policies inside the Prime Minister Office. 
As Table 2 clearly shows, three groups or agencies of the Deputy Prime Ministers who 
chaired the Screening Committees, the Prime Minister Secretary Office, and the Cabinet 
Secretary Office became to play more significant roles in submitting policies.
Looking at the increasing percentage of the NESDB (from 1.3% to 2.6%) in Table 2, 
some may argue in favor of the revival of the four core agencies.  In actuality, however, 
Thaksin frequently ordered the NESDB to formulate new policies in strict accordance 
with the state strategies, as well as the ordinary task of planning the Five-Year Plan, which 
resulted in an increase in the number of cases of policy submissions from the NESDB. 
Ironically, increasing cases reflect the diminished role of the NESDB.  Ministry of Finance 
also reduced its role in exchange of increasing role of the Deputy Prime  Ministers.
Aside from restructuring the cabinet, Thaksin also preferred to invite formal and 
informal groups outside of the government.  These groups include:
1) Members of the TRT Economic Policy Formulating Committee including Pansak 
Vinyaratn (private policy advisor to Prime Minister Thaksin), Somkid Jatusripitak 
(finance minister), Suranan Vejjajiva (spokesman), Kittidej Sutsukorn, Kitti 
 Limsakul, and Pramon Kunakasem
19) Interview conducted by the author with the TRT’s executive committee members in Bangkok, 
March 2001.
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Table 2 Policy Submissions to the Cabinet Meetings, Classified by Ministries and Institutions under the 
Chuan Administration and the Thaksin Administration
Ministries, Institutions Independent Bodies
Chuan Admin.  
(1999–2000)
Thaksin Admin.  
(2001–June, 2006)
Cases % Cases %
Prime Minister Office 404 17.6 1,268 19.1
Prime Minister Office itself 157 6.9 299 4.5
Deputy Prime Minister 25 1.1 206 3.1
Prime Minister Secretary Office 19 0.8 94 1.4
Cabinet Secretary Office 28 1.2 112 1.7
Legal Office 47 2.1 132 2.0
Civil Service Administration 25 1.1 82 1.2
NESDB 29 1.3 171 2.6
Bureau of the Budget 74 3.2 172 2.6
Ministry of Defense 35 1.5 123 1.8
Ministry of Finance 433 18.9 806 12.1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 89 3.9 313 4.7
Ministry of Interior 145 6.3 506 7.6
Ministry of Agriculture and COOP 169 7.4 466 7.0
Ministry of Commerce 92 4.0 390 5.9
Ministry of Industry 97 4.2 231 3.5
Ministry of Justice 42 1.8 117 1.8
Transportation, Technology etc. 206 9.0 865 13.0
Labor and Social Welfare 76 3.3 289 4.3
Ministry of Public Health 48 2.1 239 3.6
Education and Culture 105 4.6 341 5.1
Secretaries for the House of Representatives and the Senate 20 0.9 43 0.6
National Police Office 16 0.7 51 0.8
Others 312 13.6 606 9.1
Sub-total Ministries 2,289 100.0 6,654 100.0
Personnel appointments (Head of department and higher 
positions) 85 232
Independent bodies under the 1997 Constitution 8 44
Public Sector Development Office 0 58
Grand total 2,382 6,988
Sources: Computed and classified by the author and Kei’ichiro Oizumi on the basis of the full texts of cabinet 
meetings between 1999 and 2006.
Notes: 1) Table covers the last two years of the Chuan administration (1999 and 2000) and five years of the 
Thaksin administration (February 2001 to June 2006).
2) Transportation, technology etc. include Ministry of Transportation and Communications and Min-
istry of Science, Technology and Environment.  Since October 2002, this column includes four 
ministries.
3) Labor and social welfare include a new Ministry of Social Development and Human Security since 
October 2002.
4) Education and culture include a new Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Tourism and Sports since 
October 2002.
5) Independent bodies include the Constitution Court, the Administration Court, and the Justice Court.
6) The National Police Office became an independent body from the Prime Minister Office since 
October 2002.
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2) Policy advisors to the prime minister such as Pansak, who was a journalist, and 
Phrommin Lertsuridej, who was also appointed the Secretary-General of the 
Prime Minister Secretary Office in February 2001
3) Policy advisors to the finance minister such as Chaiyawat Wibulsawasdi, the 
former Governor of the BOT (1997–98), and Olarn Chaiprawat, who was the 
former president of the Siam Commercial Bank
4) Influential deputy prime ministers who chaired the Screening Committees
5) Members of the Strategy Committee
6) Leading figures in business circle such as Dhanin Chearavanont, the chairman 
of the CP Group, and Boonsithi Chokwatana, the head of Saha (SPI) Group20)
Fig. 1 shows the whole structure of the policy-making under the Thaksin govern-
ment.  Fig. 1 suggests the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the prime 
minister alongside the exclusion of bureaucratic influence from the decision-making 
 process.  Thaksin apparently aimed to replace the Thai bureaucratic polity with a prime 
20) These business groups changed their strategies in favor of the Thaksin government in July 2006, 
and shifted their political donations to the Democrat Party.
Fig. 1 Policy-Making Structure and Major Players in the Thaksin Administration, 2005
Sources: Interview research by the author in Bangkok from 2001 to 2005.
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minister-led politics or Thaksinocracy.
Dual-Track Policies
Populist-oriented Policy
As discussed in section II, Thaksin adopted dual-track policies, which consist of promo-
tion of the grass-roots economy in rural areas (the first track) and the enhancement of 
national competitiveness of big capitalists in urban areas (the second track).  After estab-
lishing a new government, he favored the first track over the second one.  This is in part 
because economic recovery from the Asian crisis became an urgent task for the country 
and in part because the first track was more essential for Thaksin and TRT to attract the 
support of the people.  For these reasons, Thaksin announced nine urgent economic and 
social programs in his policy speech at the Diet on February 27, 2001.
These nine programs include: 1) three years’ moratorium on farmers’ debt; 2) pro-
vision of village funds; 3) establishment of people’s banks; 4) establishment of new gov-
ernment-sponsored SMEs banks; 5) introduction of universal health services (known as 
“30-baht medical services”); 6) solution of non-performing loans through the Thai Asset 
Management Corporation (TAMC); 7) privatization of state enterprises; 8) eradication 
of drugs; and 9) anti-corruption campaign (Samnak Lekhathikan Khana Rattamontri 2002, 
91–95).  In addition to policies 1) to 5), Thaksin also introduced two well-known programs 
of OTOP and a “Ban Ua-arthon” project which provided lower-income households with 
cheaper housing facilities.  Seven of the policies were originally part of the TRT campaign 
promises in the general election and became core projects of the first track or the promo-
tion of the grass-roots economy.
In July 2001, the Thaksin government announced the “mid-term economic policies 
2001–2006” to the public.  Before the cabinet meeting, NESDB and the Fiscal Policy 
Office prepared their original plan which was principally based on the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan (2001–2005).  But this plan did not fully reflect Thaksin’s policy speech in February. 
Glancing at the original plan, Thaksin got angry and immediately ordered the NESDB to 
revise it in accordance with his policy speech.  Consequently, the revised agenda was 
submitted to a cabinet meeting in July, which included all the programs in both prime 
minister’s policy speech and the TRT campaign promise.21)  In Thaksin’s view, the 
21) Author’s interview with the NESDB staffs in Bangkok, August 2001.  This plan is officially named 
a “Strategies for Improvement of Quality of Economic Growth and Sustainable National Economic 
Development 2001–2006,” which consists of two parts and 28 items.
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NESDB ought to follow the state strategy addressed by the prime minister rather than 
the targets of the Five-Year Plan set by the former government.  This incident symboli-
cally highlights the declining autonomy of the NESDB in policy-making.
Table 3 summarizes the major programs in the first-track policies.  All the programs 
started within 2001 and total expenditure amounted to 300 billion baht, or the equivalent 
of 30% of total budget allocation in FY2002.  As the table shows, each program achieved 
a visible outcome, which contributed to the huge popularity of the first Thaksin govern-
ment.  On the other hand, the enormous amount of expenditure for these populist- 
oriented policies provoked severe criticism from the mass media on the grounds that 
these programs were undertaken without ordinary budget allocation (off-budget system). 
In section VI, I will return to the important question of how the Thaksin government 
financed these policies under the existing budget system.
Table 3 Populist-oriented Policies under the Thaksin Administration (As of 2005)
Programmes Policy Performance
(1) Village funds
Start from March 2001, providing investment funds with 1 million baht (3% of 
preferable interest rate) equally for villages and urban communities.  By the end 
of 2002, 73,941 villages and communities registered and received a total of 77.5 
billion baht, while outstanding loans accounted for 233.3 billion baht (16.3 million 
cases) (NESDB 2003b, 3/4–3/6; 2005, 5/19).
(2) People’s bank
Start from June 2001, providing non-collateral loans through the Government 
Savings Bank for small business and own-account merchants in urban and rural 
areas.  By the end of 2003, 310,000 persons joined this scheme, while outstand-
ing of loans accounted for 3.1 billion baht (NESDB 2003b, 6/4–6/5; 2005, 5/20).
(3) Debt moratorium for 
poor farmers
Start from April, providing moratorium for farmers’ borrowings from the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) for three years.  By Sep-
tember 2001, 2.31 million farmers were approved by the BAAC with a total 
amount of 94.3 billion baht (NESDB 2003b, 3/4–3/6).
(4) One tambon one product 
(OTOP)
Start from September 2001 to promote village business on the basis of the Thai 
Rak Thai’s “stand-alone model” as well as Oita Prefecture’s experience.  Total 
sales of certified village products amounted to 33,000 million baht (6,921 prod-
ucts) in 2003 and 43,000 million baht (20,589 products) in 2004, respectively 
(NESDB 2005, 5/21).
(5) 30-baht medical service 
program
Start from April 2001, providing medical services with each 30 baht payment at 
public health centers for all the people who did not joined any scheme of the 
government health insurance services.  By the end of 2004, 47.07 million per-
sons were given “gold cards” (NESDB 2005, 6/8).
(6) SMEs finance Financial supports by the government for the SMEs amounted to 157 billion baht between 2001 and 2004.
(7) Ban Ua-arthon project  
(Housing project for 
low-income groups)
Total of 48,000 households obtained houses through this project.
Sources: NESDB (2003b; 2005); Suehiro (2009, 163).
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Shift of Policy Priority to the Second Track
In 2002, the Thaksin government expanded its policy objectives to the second track or 
the National Competitiveness Plan (NCP), in which the government selected five major 
sectors (food processing, automobiles, fashion industry, tourism industry, and develop-
ment of software services) as targets and planned to enhance international competitive-
ness in the world market.  What should be quickly noted here is the fact that the previ-
ous Chuan government had already adopted a similar plan, the Industrial Restructuring 
Plan (IRP).  IRP was formulated by the Ministry of Industry in collaboration with the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Japan International 
 Cooperation Agency (JICA), and selected 11 strategic industries for promotion.  But 
Thaksin completely neglected this plan, and ordered the NESDB to submit a new plan 
in collaboration with Michael Porter, a professor of the Harvard Business School (NESDB 
2003c).22)
Unlike the IRP which focused on the improvement of efficiency and productivity of 
manufacturing sector through the development of supporting industries (Japanese ideas), 
NCP imported key concepts such as innovation and industrial clustering based on the 
policy advice of Porter as well as textbooks in the American business schools (Porter 
2003).  The complete text of NCP was submitted by the NESDB and approved by the 
cabinet meeting in October 2003.  Although NESDB was officially designated the respon-
sible agency of NCP, the actual people in charge were Porter and the SASIN which was 
the most influential business school in Thailand.  NESDB could no longer take initiative 
as a primary planner, and merely served as a coordinator for planning.
After the general election in February 2005, the second Thaksin government explic-
itly shifted its policy priority from the first track in favor of the people to the second 
track in favor of domestic and foreign investors.  Since TRT had won 75% of seats in the 
House of Representatives, Thaksin did not need to pay special attention to the masses 
as he had to do before.  For instance, in May 2005, the Ministry of Finance announced 
“Mega Projects” with a total cost of 1,800 billion baht and appealed to foreign investors 
to invest in attractive mass transportation projects in Bangkok Metropolitan area.  In the 
same period, Thaksin also ordered the NESDB to formulate the 10th Five-Year Plan 
(October 2006–September 2011), which emphasized profit-making agriculture on the 
basis of  bio-technology and provincial cluster development plans based on the CEO 
 Governors.  Unlike the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the new plan accorded less importance to 
traditional policy objectives such as poverty reduction in rural areas (World Bank 
22) For a comparative study on the objectives, the process of policy-making, and the institutional frame-
work between the IRP and the NCP, see Suehiro (2010).
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2001).23)  From the middle of 2005 onward, Thaksin also accelerated the privatization of 
state enterprises to attract more foreign capital to the local stock market.  All the pro-
grams were integrated into state strategies to modernize the Kingdom of Thailand 
(KTMF) (Suehiro 2008).
From Thaksin’s viewpoint, there are two major obstacles to KTMF’s ambitious 
strategy aimed at transforming Thailand into a modern state.  One is the traditional 
bureaucracy, including government officers’ culture, and the other is the existing budget 
system under the strict control of line ministries.  Consequently, he focused his political 
targets on the two major fields of the public sector and the budget system.
Reform of the Public Sector
Thaksin’s Views on Traditional Bureaucracy
The first obstacle to Thaksin’s reform is the old-fashioned bureaucracy.  According to 
his observation, Thai bureaucracy has too many agencies and there is no organic link-
age in activity between organizations.  Thai public services are too slow despite global 
capitalism’s “economy of speed.”24)  He also severely criticized the traditional bureau-
cracy because it lacked efficiency in delivering public services, had no strategy in policy- 
making, and lacked competition in the work place.  Rather it merely encouraged bonding 
among its members and a conservative attitude against any criticism coming from the 
outside.
On September 11, 2002, Thaksin addressed the issue of “Reform of a country, 
reform of the public sector” in the prime minister’s residence.  In this speech, he dis-
closed the fact that he ordered the Prime Minister Office to disband around 300 out of 
600 national committees, and revealed his plan to reorganize existing government agen-
cies into more networking-based and agenda-based organizations (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 
291–308).  More important, he emphasized in the same speech the necessity of reform-
ing traditional bureaucratic culture and government officers’ consciousness.  He claimed: 
23) In October of 2005, March and June of 2006, the NESDB submitted again and again revised drafts 
to the cabinet meeting because there was a sharp conflict between the Thaksin’s own ideas based 
on his state strategy and the NESDB’s original proposals based on the philosophy of “sufficiency 
economy” (setthakit phophiang) propounded by the king.  For an account for the ideas behind the 
“sufficiency economy,” see UNDP (2007) and Suehiro (2009, Ch. 4).
24) Thaksin preferred to use the term “the economy of speed” rather than “the economy of scale,” 
because he liked very much the book, Business at the Speed of Thought, by Bill Gates of Microsoft 
Corporation (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 177; Vol. 2, 338).
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“Most important task for us is to reform the old culture of work together into a new one 
at the levels of government officers, the relationship between public sector and a country, 
and the relationship between public sector and the people.  We need a new culture of work 
together.  We cannot make the excuse that we have poor performance because our sys-
tem is out-of-date.  The era is always changing and it requests us a reform” (ibid., 300–
301, underscoring by the author).
On this account, he severely condemned the out-of-date system (rabop la-samai) 
and called for the introduction of modern public services on the basis of advanced tech-
nology (e-Government), agenda-based organizations, explicit visions (wisaithat), well-
organized strategy, and competition among government officers.  Based on such views, 
he launched the reform of traditional bureaucracy by setting up the Public Sector Develop-
ment Commission (PSDC) in October 2002 (Nakharin 2008).  Before examining the 
activity of the PSDC, let me briefly review the structure of government officials and the 
mechanism of personnel management in the public sector in order to help the reader to 
understand the real cause behind the Thaksin’s reform.
The Structure of Government Officials in Thailand
Fig. 2 shows the category of public personnel and the distribution of civil servants and 
employees by the category.  Figures on the basis of my own research in 1996 are out of 
date for the current situation.  However, there are no comparable figures and the present 
system principally follows the same category.  Therefore, I employ the 1996 survey to 
depict the structure of Thai bureaucracy (Suehiro 2006).
Public personnel (2,586,000 persons) consists of five major categories: political 
 officials (776 persons); permanent officials (1,169,000 persons); departmental employees 
(695,000 persons); local officials (421,000 persons); and staff and employees of 23 state 
enterprises (300,000 persons).  Among them, permanent officials belong to a category 
of government officials in a broader sense.  Permanent officials are further classified into 
seven sub-categories including police officers and prosecutors.  Among them, three 
groups belong to a category of government officials in a narrower sense.  They include 
530, 000 teachers at public schools under the auspice of the Teacher Council, 380,000 
civil servants in central public agencies under the auspice of the Civil Service Commis-
sion (CSC), and 49,000 professors and lecturers under the auspice of the University 
Official Commission.  Here, I focus on the second group of civil servants under the 
CSC.
All the civil servants are recruited through standard examinations adopted by the 
CSC and otherwise through particular examinations conducted by several high-ranked 
ministries (Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs).  After entering public agencies, 
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they are all ranked in the P (position) and C (classification) table according to their final 
educational qualifications.  For instance, a person with educational level of high school 
or vocational school is ranked as C1, while a new graduate from a university is ranked as 
C3-2.  A Ph.D. holder starts his/her career at C5-4.  The PC table is completely linked 
to the salary table, and every person is automatically promoted by at least one rank each 
year.
What is unique to Thailand is that the government principally does not employ mid-
career persons from the private sector.  Those who desire to enter into the public agency 
must start their careers in the same way as fresh students in accordance with educational 
Fig. 2 Structure of Bureaucracy in Thailand (1995)
Source: Interview research by the author at the Ko.Pho in Bangkok, April 1996.
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qualification.  On the other hand, all the civil servants are guaranteed employment until 
the retirement age or 60 years old (since 1953), and they can equally enjoy the right to 
receive government pension, medical health insurance, and other fringe benefits.  In this 
sense, personnel management of government officials has been basically designed as a 
closed organization on the basis of service years.
Civil servants are also ranked by the job and post classifications from C1 to C11 and 
P11 as illustrated in Table 4.  For example, C7 is given to a section chief, while C8 to a 
director general of department.  Between C1 to C4 (or C5), each person is automatically 
Table 4 Distribution of Government Officers by Position and Classification (P.C.), 1994
Classification Position Persons % Educational Qualification
P11 Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry  (Palat Krasuwang) 13 –
C11 Advisor, or Inspector-General of the Ministry (Phu Taruwat Rachakan Krasuwang) 84 0.01
C10
Director-General of the Department (Athibodi 
Krom), Governor of the Province, Regional 
Inspector (Phu Taruwat Rachakan Khet), 
Governor of the State Enterprise
786 0.08
C9
Director of the Bureau, the Office or the Board, 
Deputy Director-General of the Department 
(Rong Athibodi Krom), Deputy Permanent 
Secretary (Rong Palat Krasuwang)
4,558 0.49
C8
Director of the Division (Huana Kong, Phu-
amnuaikan Kong, Phu-amnuaikan Suwan), 
Assistant Governor, Nai Amphoe (District 
Officer), Governor of High School
15,981 1.72
C7 Section Chief (Huana Phanaek), Deputy Nai Amphoe, School Master of Primary School 46,067 4.95
C6 Group Chief 280,273 30.11
C5 Ph.D. 221,642 23.81 C5-4
C4 Master degree 193,115 20.75 C4-2
C3 Bachelor degree 108,001 11.60 C3-2
C2 Two years technical college (Po.Wo.So.) 42,426 4.56 C2-4
C1 Vocational school (Po.Wo.Cho.) 17,844 1.92 C1-4
Total 930,777 100.00
Sources: Interview research by the author at the Ko.Pho. (April 1996) in Bangkok; Somucho Chokan-kambo 
Kikaku-ka (1995, 46).
Notes: 1) C=Common Level, P=Permanent Secretary.
2) Rector of the University is ranked as C10.
3) C1–C5 indicate the range of promotion for government officers with non-university while C3–C7 
for government officers with bachelor degree and over.  C5 is the ceiling for the former; C7 for the 
latter.
4) Promotion to C8 and over (managerial posts) is conducted on the basis of selection and evaluation. 
Nobody can be promoted to the post of C8 and over so far as the post is not vacant.
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promoted according to his/her years of service.  From C6 and over, performance evalu-
ation becomes more important in the screening process because of limits in the number 
of available posts.  Indeed, civil servants with C7 account for 46,000 persons, equivalent 
to 16% of those ranked with C6 (280,000 persons).  Finally, a group of C8 and over 
belongs to an elite class in the public sector of Thailand, and account for a mere 2.3% of 
the total number of civil servants.25)
Promotion to the High Ranked Posts
Apart from the cases of director generals of the Department of Customs, secretary gen-
erals of the NESDB and governors of the Bank of Thailand (BOT), most of civil servants 
enter a particular department and are promoted to higher posts in the same department. 
For director generals of the Department of Customs until the 1970s, several persons 
were recruited from the National Police Office (Krom Sulakakorn 1994, 11–31), while 
both governors of the BOT and secretary generals of the NESDB until the end of the 
1980s were appointed from among the elites of the Ministry of Finance (Suehiro 2005, 
58–59).  Except for these cases, we see very few cases of personal transfer across differ-
ent ministries, and even across different departments.  Personnel changes across at 
departments are basically confined to persons who will be promoted to the posts of direc-
tor general, superintendent, and the permanent secretary.26)  In addition to the strict rule 
of internally-promotion, three other principles seem to characterize personnel manage-
ment in higher ranked posts of Thai bureaucracy.
First, a permanent secretary is expected to have occupied the highest posts of 
important departments in each ministry.  These posts include the Department of 
 Comptroller General, the Department of Customs and the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO) for 
the Ministry of Finance; the Department of Foreign Trade and/or the Department of 
Internal Trade for the Ministry of Commerce; the Department of Medical Services 
and/or the Department of Health for the Ministry of Public Health; and the Department 
of Industrial Economics and/or the Department of Industrial Promotion for the Ministry 
of Industry.
Second, the tenure of director general and permanent secretary is neither regulated 
by law nor determined by an implicit consensus, as is the case in Japan.  Tenure is fre-
25) Position and classification (P.C.) system for government officers was officially abolished by the 
Thaksin government before the 2006 military coup.
26) These fact findings and description on the rule of personnel management are based on the author’s 
survey on 750 persons in director generals and permanent secretaries in major ministries.  This 
work was conducted in cooperation with Ukrist Pathmanand of Chulalongkorn University in 2004 
and 2005.
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quently determined by the will of superiors such as the permanent secretary and the 
ability of candidate.  Consequently, the period of tenure varies very widely between one 
month and 10 years.  From the 1990s onward, however, tenure seems to converge into 
two or three years, and the person is customarily appointed on October 1, and resigns 
on September 30, in accordance with the Thai fiscal year.
Third, prior to the 1970s, there was frequent evidence of a “fast track system.”  If 
a candidate had a good family background (royal or aristocrats family members), high 
educational qualification outside of Thailand, and prominent performance, he/she could 
obtain higher post faster than others.  It was not difficult to find permanent secretaries 
in their mere 40s.  Since the mid-1980s, however, the age of appointment to the post of 
permanent secretary began to concentrate in the range of 57 to 59 years old, or 1 to 3 
years before retirement.  This fact implies that the promotion to the post of permanent 
secretary has been standardized in a hierarchical structure.
These characteristics have contributed to creating the stable structure of Thai 
bureaucracy.  As I mentioned above, civil servants with lower ranks are automatically 
promoted according to their years of service, while an elite class with higher ranks is 
promoted on the basis of performance evaluation and good human relationship inside a 
particular organization.  These rules naturally produce characteristics specific to the Thai 
bureaucracy, notably an inward-looking and conservative culture that is impervious to 
criticism from the outside.  This is precisely the point that Thaksin attacked in the 
 process of his public sector reform.
Who Were Promoted to Permanent Secretaries?
To test and confirm the rule of determining the promotion system, let me employ two 
case studies of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as 
examples.  Table 5 summarizes the career path of each person who occupied the perma-
nent secretary (PS) of the MOF between 1975 and 2005.  Major facts derived from the 
table together with my research on PS’s educational qualification are as follows.
1) The majority of these PSMOF was holders of Ph.D. or Master Degree (Econom-
ics), and was educated in prestigious universities in the United States and Europe 
such as Michigan University (Amnuay), University of Illinois (Panas), University 
of London (Suparat), and Cambridge University (Jatumongkol).
2) Except for Aran (1993–95) who was transferred from the Ministry of Commerce, 
all the persons were promoted internally within the MOF.
3) For the cases of Amnuay (1975–77) and Panas (1982–92), PSMOF were pro-
moted with the ages of 46 and 50, and the tenure of Panas covered 10 years. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































However, since the period of Bandit (1992–93), a “fast track system” was 
replaced by a more standardized system in which the PS was appointed to the 
post three to four years before retirement, and his tenure was confined to two 
to three years.
4) Before being appointed to the post of PSMOF, most of people had stints as direc-
tor generals in at least three different mainstream departments of Comptroller 
 General, Customs, and FPO.  In recent years, main departments have shifted 
to the Department of Revenue and the Department of Excise due to the increas-
ing authority in revenue estimates.
A comparison of the cases of PSMOF and PSMOI reveals both similarities and 
 differences in their promotion systems (see Table 6).
1) Concerning educational background, based on my research, all the people of 
PSMOI were educated in local (not foreign) prestigious universities such as 
 Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University.  And all the persons were 
further educated in the National College of Defense.
2) Most of these PSMOI were promoted step by step from district chiefs (nai 
amphoe) to governors of multiple provinces to director generals of mainstream 
departments such as the Department of Government (Krom Kan Pok-khrong) 
and the Department of Local Government.  The career path for PSMOI seems 
to be more institutionalized than in the case of the Ministry of Finance.
3) Except for Chanasak (1997–2002), the tenures of all the persons were short (one 
to two years).  Furthermore, appointment to PSMOI was conducted in accordance 
with regular personnel changes starting in October of each year.
The cases of PSMOI suggest that personnel promotion of the high ranked officials 
has been completely dominated by the explicit rule of the line ministry.  Even Interior 
Minister must follow this rule in personnel management.
Thaksin’s Reforms of the Public Sector
Since October 2002, the Thaksin government embarked on ambitious reform of the 
public sector in three different directions.  These reforms include: 1) reorganization of 
government agencies on the basis of the agenda; 2) changes in personnel management 
on the basis of meritocracy rather than seniority system; and 3) improvement of public 
services according to the documented four year plan in each agency.
Concerning the reorganization of the public sector, Thaksin ordered the restructur-
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Table 6 Career of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, 1957–2005
No. Name of PS  of MOI
Birth Date  











n.a. 1957/9/19– 63/9/30 n.a. n.a.







of Land  
(56–57)
Deputy Director-
General of Mahat 
Thai (51–55)
Director of Kong 
Kan Pokkhrong 
(47–49)




















Governor of Samut 
Prakarn  
(59–)



















Director of Policy 
and Planning 
Office, MOI






Secretary of the 
Province
































































of the Ministry 
(81–82)



































15 Chanasak Yuwaboon n.a.
1997/10/1–
2002/3/5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
16 Yongyut  Vichaidit n.a.
2002/3/5– 
9/30 n.a. n.a. n.a.
17 Sermsak  Phongpanich 1946/7/23
2002/10/1– 











Master of School  
of Government 
(93–94)
Source: Made by the author in cooperation with Ukrist Pathmanand of Chulalongkorn University in 2005.
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ing of 14 ministries (plus the Prime Minister Office or PMO) with 125 departments into 
19 ministries (plus PMO) with 156 departments.27)  Contrary to the original plan of down-
sizing public organizations, Thaksin was forced to increase the number of government 
agencies.  This is in part because he had to deal with the potential dissatisfaction of 
government officials by increasing the number of posts (departments), and in part because 
he planned to reconstruct government organization more strategically by allocating a 
particular agency for a particular agenda.
For instance, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environments (MSTE: four 
departments and five offices) was reorganized into the Ministry of Science and Technol-
ogy (one department and three offices).  At the same time, the Department of Energy 
Promotion belonging to the former MSTE was transferred to a new ministry (the Min-
istry of Energy), while two agencies of the Department of Environmental Quality Promo-
tion and the Office of Environmental Policy were integrated into another new ministry 
(the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment).  Each agency was attached to an 
existing or new ministry according to its own agenda, while a lot of departments and 
offices were set up to undertake new state strategies such as the Department of Develop-
ment of Thai Traditional and Alternative Medicine in the Ministry of Public Health, the 
Department of Intellectual Property in the Ministry of Commerce, and the Office of 
Welfare Promotion, Protection and Empowerment of Vulnerable Groups in the new 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security.
Concerning personnel management, Thaksin introduced a new system or promotion 
based on the principle of meritocracy.  He empowered not the Permanent Secretary but 
the Minister to directly appoint director generals, and made it possible to transfer able 
persons across at different ministries, or to appoint younger persons regardless of the 
traditional order of P (position) and C (classification) system.  Thus, in September 2004, 
Jakramon Pasukwanich, who was the former secretary general of the NESDB, was trans-
ferred to the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry, while Ampol Kittiampol, 
a director general in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, was newly appointed 
to serve as secretary general of the NESDB.  Naris Chaiyasut who was the former rector 
of the Thammasat University, was appointed director general of Fiscal Policy Office over 
possible candidates from inside the Ministry of Finance.  At the level of director general, 
a lot of persons were selected by their abilities or their connections with TRT.  Such 
system of promotion undoubtedly had a great impact on traditional order and familial 
27) For more detail information on reorganization of the government agencies, see two royal degrees 
concerning “Reforms of Ministries and Departments” on October 2, 2002 (in Thai), which are 
included into the Racha-kitchanubeksa (Royal Thai Government Gazette), Vol. 119, Part 99 Ko. 
(pp. 14–34) and Part 102 Ko. (pp. 66–85).
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relationship in each office, and in turn stoked strong resistance among government offi-
cials (Nakharin 2008).
Finally, the Thaksin government set up the Office of Public Sector Development Com-
mission (OPSDC) by appointing Vishnu Krua-ngam as its chairman on October 3, 2002.28) 
Major members include Bowornsak Uwanno, Chai-anan Samudavanija, and Orapin Sop-
chokchai, who had worked for the reform of public sector in the Chatichai government 
(1988–91) (OPSDC 2005a, 8–9).  In May 2003, the cabinet meeting decided to approve 
an action plan submitted by the OPSDC which aimed to reduce by 30–50% the steps or 
the time needed for particular public service in each agency.  The OPSDC document 
reported that the Department of Land Transport successfully reduced the time of issuing 
payment certification for automobile taxes from 30 minutes to 7 minutes, while the 
National Police Office reduced the time of arranging the formalities for going abroad from 
15 days to 7 days (ibid., 12–13).
In 2003, the OPSDC adopted the “Strategic Plan for Public Sector Development 
2003–2007.” This strategic plan consists of four major targets: 1) reform of the role, 
activities and the size of public sector (e-Service, service link, downsizing of organization 
etc.); 2) democratization of public services (people’s audit etc.); 3) quality improvement 
of public services in order to meet the real needs of the people; and 4) capacity building 
of government officials such as the “I AM READY” program (ibid., 11).  “I AM READY” 
is the acronym of the slogan, “Integrity, Activeness, Morality, Relevancy, Efficiency, 
Accountability, Democracy and Yield” (ibid., 57–58).  In parallel to the NCP which used 
American concepts from business schools, OPSDC also preferred to use English- language 
key concepts from the school of modern public management developed in Australia and 
Europe.29)
In 2005, OPSDC accelerated the reform of public services on the basis of the “Action 
Plan of Public Services Development 2005–2008” under the second Thaksin government 
(2005–08).  This action plan requested each agency to define the target, strategy, coop-
eration with other agencies, concrete plan to improve the efficiency of public services, 
and budget needed in the four-year plan (OPSDC 2005b; Samnakngan Ngop-praman 
2006).  The Action Plan of 2005–2008 had a substantial impact on both working style of 
government officials (overtime work etc.) and the existing system of budget allocation 
28) For more on Vishnu’s idea of administrative reforms, see Vishnu (2002).
29) Author’s interview with Nakharin Maektrairat, the Dean of Faculty of Political Science of Tham-
masat University in June 2006, in Tokyo.  Concerning the implementation of “Strategic Plan for 
Public Sector Development,” Thaksin himself explicitly underlined its necessity in his speech of 
September 21, 2003 with the title of “Development of the Quality of Our Country under the CEO 
Regime” (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 73–87).
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under the control of line ministries.  Accordingly, let me move to another reform of the 
Thaksin government, namely, reform of the budget system.
Reform of the Budget System
Strategic Performance Based Budget System (SPBBS)
Another obstacle to Thaksin’s state reforms is the existing budget system in which most 
of the budget has been put under the direct control of responsible ministries  according 
to their functions.  In other words, responsible (line) ministries at first submit project 
proposals in conjunction with the targets set by a Five-Year Plan, while the four core 
agencies of the NESDB, FPO, BOT, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) consult with 
each other to decide on the budget allocation for each bottom-up project.  For instance, 
in the Chuan government, 93.5 billion out of the total of 910 billion baht in FY 2001 were 
allocated to projects of local development, which include the “Development of Potential-
ity in Rural and Community People Program” (67.5 billion baht).  It is reported that eight 
ministries and two government agencies were responsible for these projects, and neces-
sary funds were delivered to each project through line ministry (BOB, Thailand’s Budget 
in Brief FY2001, 94–95).  Such budget allocation typically shows the traditional style 
politics of clemency and charity targeting the rural poor people.
In addition, the procedures of budget allocation must follow the 1959 Act of the 
Budget.  This act was formulated by Puey Ungpakorn (Governor of BOT and Director of 
BOB in that day) and his associates in order to strictly separate central budget between 
investment expenditures based on economic planning and ordinary expenditures includ-
ing personnel expenses (Suehiro 2005).  In 1982, the Prem government changed Puey’s 
policy (British style) to the Planning Programming Budget System (American style) or 
PPBS for the sake of improving the consistency and the effectiveness of budget planning 
(BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief FY1982).  Introduction of the PPBS was a part of policy 
conditionality required of the Thai government by the World Bank in exchange of its 
structural adjustment loans (SALs).
Twenty years later, Thaksin ordered the BOB to replace the PPBS by a new policy 
of Strategic Performance Based Budget System or the SPBBS (Pran 2004, Vol. 1, 324–
325).  The new budget policy shifted the procedure of budget allocation from the bottom-
up approach from line ministries to the top-down approach from the prime minister and 
the ruling party.  Following the policy of the SPBBS, the BOB announced three major 
principles in budget planning: 1) putting priority on fiscal support of promoting the auton-
omy of local governments; 2) replacing function-based budget allocation by agenda-based 
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one; and 3) introducing a four-year budget plan (FY2005–2008) for each agency in cor-
respondence to the tenure of the second Thaksin government.30)  All public agencies 
were forced to follow these principles, and to demonstrate definitely the necessity of each 
particular project with reference to state strategies addressed by the prime minister. 
Such policies are completely interconnected with the shift of policy-making system from 
a Five-Year Plan to state strategies as mentioned in section III.
Changes in the Pattern of Budget Allocation
Table 7 traces the budget allocation by functions, in the period of between FY1991 and 
FY2011, including the period of Thaksin government (from FY2002 to FY 2006).  Accord-
ing to the policy of the BOB, functions of budget allocation are classified into four major 
30) Interviews conducted by the author at the Research and Planning Division of the BOB in August 
2006, in Bangkok.
Table 7 Budget Allocation by Functions in Thailand, FY 1991–2011





General Administration Community and Social Services
Economic 
ServicesSub-total Defense Sub-total Education Health Social Security
1991 387,500 26.2 16.0 31.3 19.3 5.7 3.1 23.3
1992 460,400 25.3 15.4 31.0 18.6 5.7 3.1 24.3
1993 560,000 24.5 14.3 33.8 19.3 6.2 3.4 25.5
1994 625,000 24.1 13.8 35.5 19.5 6.8 3.6 26.5
1995 715,000 22.4 12.6 37.1 18.9 6.9 3.8 27.0
1996 843,200 22.8 11.6 38.4 19.9 7.1 4.3 28.9
1997 925,000 20.8 11.0 40.5 21.9 7.4 4.2 29.0
1998 830,000 20.7 10.0 43.0 24.9 7.7 4.1 26.0
1999 825,000 19.8 9.3 42.2 25.1 7.3 4.4 24.2
2000 860,000 20.4 8.9 43.6 25.7 7.4 5.4 22.1
2001 910,000 19.6 8.4 42.0 24.4 7.1 5.7 22.5
2002 1,023,000 18.2 7.5 41.6 21.8 7.1 6.9 23.3
2003 999,900 19.1 7.6 42.1 23.5 7.8 7.6 20.6
2004 1,163,500 18.0 6.4 40.4 21.6 7.2 6.5 24.3
2005 1,250,000 16.9 6.2 38.1 21.0 7.1 6.9 23.7
2006 1,360,000 17.8 6.3 40.0 21.7 7.4 7.0 25.0
2007 1,566,200 18.1 7.3 41.8 22.7 9.5 7.2 21.2
2008 1,660,000 19.8 8.6 41.8 22.0 9.3 6.9 19.3
2009 1,835,000 20.8 9.2 41.7 21.8 9.0 6.9 17.9
2010 1,700,000 25.1 9.0 41.7 22.3 10.5 6.9 16.9
2011 2,070,000 25.1 8.1 39.6 20.4 10.1 6.7 20.5
Source: Made by the author on the basis of Thailand’s Budget in Brief (BOB, each edition).
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categories: 1) general administration or general government services (general public 
services, defense matters, public order, and security); 2) community and social services 
(education, public health, social security, housing, religions, etc.); 3) economic services 
(energy, agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, communications, etc.); and 4) mis-
cellaneous and unclassified items (BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief FY2006, 62–65). 
Looking at the table, we can easily find remarkable changes in the period of the Thaksin 
government.
First of all, the category of “national defense” showed a rapid decline in terms of 
percentage of allocation, which decreased from 16.0% in FY1991 through 8.9% in FY2000 
to merely 6.3% in FY2006.  Since the size of the total budget has increased by threefold 
in the corresponding period, the Ministry of Defense could maintain the same level in 
terms of actual value (see Fig. 3 in later).  But it is apparent that the issue of national 
defense has been less important for the Thaksin government.  In fact, he frequently 
addressed in his speeches that “the cold war regime collapsed and the era of competition 
for military expansion ended as well.  We (Thailand) were facing a new era of economic 
competition in the world capitalism” (Shukan Tai Keizai, January 30, 2006).  Such percep-
tion has naturally angered the military group, and became one of the leading causes 
behind the coup against Thaksin in September 2006.
Second, in contrast to declining role of defense matters, the percentage of social 
security has steadily increased from 3.1% in FY1991 to 5.4% in FY2000 to 7.0% in 
FY2006.  This trend suggests that the Thaksin government aimed to develop a welfare 
state in keeping with Thailand’s economic status as a middle-income country.  In line 
with this idea, Thaksin attempted to introduce universal health services scheme and 
nation-wide pension scheme, comparable to those in advanced countries.31)
Third, contrary to our expectation, the percentage of economic services, particularly 
transportation and communications, does not show a notable increase because the 
 Thaksin government sought to reduce public investments, and instead, promote private 
investments through local stock market.  This policy was expressed strategically through 
strict restrictions on public foreign borrowings and privatization of profitable state enter-
prises.32)
On the other hand, Table 8 summarizes the distribution of budget expenditures 
from the viewpoint of responsible institutions.  Institutions are basically classified into six 
groups: central funds; ministries (19 ministries and the PMO in FY2006); independent 
31) An idea of nation-wide pension scheme was abolished later due to the budget constraints.  For an 
overview of social security system in Thailand, see Niwat (2004).
32) After the 2006 coup, the percentages of economic services have further decreased due to political 
needs of increasing general administration and health services.
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public agencies (13 agencies); independent bodies under the 1997 Constitution (8 bodies); 
state enterprises (22 enterprises); and revolving funds (BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief 
FY2006, 75–86).
The most prominent changes in budget allocation in the Thaksin government are 
the decline of ministries and increase of the central fund in terms of their percentages. 
Percentage of ministries had usually accounted for 84 to 87% of the total budget allocation 
Table 8 Budget Allocation by Institutions in Thailand, FY 1991–2011


















1991 387,500 10.2 87.0 0.4 0.0 2.3 0.1
1992 460,000 11.8 83.5 0.5 0.0 2.3 1.8
1993 560,000 9.8 84.9 0.6 0.0 3.1 1.5
1994 625,000 9.8 85.2 0.5 0.0 2.9 1.6
1995 715,000 13.6 81.6 0.5 0.0 2.6 1.7
1996 843,200 10.6 84.4 0.6 0.0 2.8 1.6
1997 925,000 9.3 85.1 0.5 0.0 2.7 2.4
1998 830,000 9.5 84.2 0.6 0.0 3.2 2.5
1999 825,000 9.3 80.3 5.2 0.0 2.6 2.7
2000 860,000 8.9 78.6 5.5 0.2 2.8 3.9
2001 910,000 9.6 77.4 5.2 0.4 3.5 3.9
2002 1,023,000 18.0 67.6 4.7 0.8 3.6 5.3
2003 999,900 14.8 69.1 5.1 0.8 4.2 5.9
2004 1,163,500 22.8 62.8 4.8 0.8 3.4 5.3
2005 1,250,000 20.0 65.6 4.4 1.1 3.3 5.5
2006 1,360,000 18.8 65.9 4.8 1.1 3.7 5.7
2007 1,566,200 12.6 68.2 4.7 0.9 5.2 8.4
2008 1,660,000 14.6 68.4 4.2 0.8 6.4 7.5
2009 1,835,000 13.1 68.3 4.2 0.6 3.0 6.9
2010 1,700,000 12.6 71.4 4.4 0.6 2.9 6.8
2011 2,070,000 12.8 67.2 4.0 0.6 5.6 6.2
Sources: Arranged by the author on the basis of “Summary of Expenditure by Ministry and Department” in 
Thailand’s Budget in Brief (BOB, each edition).
Notes: 1) Independent public agencies include the offices of the His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, 
the Bureau of Royal Household, the National Buddhism, the Attorney-General and so on.  As of 
2006, the number accounts for 13 institutions.
2) Independent bodies under the 1997 Constitution include the offices of the Constitution Court, the 
Administrative Courts, the Court of Justice, the Election Commission of Thailand, the Ombudsman, 
the National Human Right Commission, the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Auditor-
General of Thailand and so on, which account for 8 bodies in 2006.
3) The number of state enterprises achieves 18 for 1992, 23 for 1994, 23 for 1996, 22 for 2000, 19 for 
2004, and 22 for 2006, respectively.
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until the FY1998.  In FY1999, the National Police Office was separated from the Ministry 
of Interior, and was transferred to the status of independent public agency.  Its budget or 
38.1 billion baht accounted for 4.6% of the total amount in FY1999.  If the National Police 
Office were included into ministries, line ministries continue to account for 84.9%, not 
80.3% in the table.33)  However, in the period of Thaksin government, the percentage of 
ministries dramatically decreased from 80.3% in FY1999 to 62.8% in FY2004 and 65.9% 
in FY2006.  In contrast, central fund increased its percentage from 9.3% to 22.8% and 
18.8% in corresponding fiscal years.
The central fund or ngop klang is originally designed as a special fund to meet extra 
expenditures such as natural disasters, royal tours, additional payments for government 
employees, and special funds for early retirement of government officials.  In addition to 
these items, two other categories took up sizable chunks of the central fund before the 
Thaksin government.  These two include expenditures on government pensions and 
projects of emergency local development.  Indeed, expenditures on government pensions 
accounted for as much as 40% of the total central fund in the Chuan government due to 
increasing number of government officials who reached retirement age.  On the other 
hand, a project of “emergency local development” was frequently used as political instru-
ments for each coalition government to attract supports from the rural people (Jarat 
1995).
What is important here is the fact that the central fund (and revolving funds) is 
substantially independent from any line ministry and is subordinate to the cabinet.  For 
that reason, the Thaksin government intended to utilize the central fund as much as 
possible to promote its state strategies.  As Table 9 clearly shows, major strategic 
 projects (see section IV of this article) such as debt repayment of village funds, reserve 
economic resuscitation (populist-oriented programs for SMEs and rural people), NCP, 
and provincial cluster development strategy plan were unexceptionally undertaken by 
using this fund.  On the other hand, after the 2006 coup, these strategic projects were 
suspended by the new government, and  budget allocations from the central fund were 
completely stopped as Table 9 demonstrates.34)
33) In the process of reorganizing the government sector in October 2002, Thaksin changed again the 
status of the National Police Office into an independent body under the direct control of the prime 
minister.  So, it is not adequate to integrate the budge of the National Police Office into line 
 ministries.
34) After the end of the Thaksin government, the budget allocation for the central fund reincreased 
from 198 billion baht in FY2007 to 266 billion baht in FY2011.  This recovery should be attributed 
to rapid increase of government subsidies for pensions and health insurance schemes for govern-
ment officials.
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Importantly, additional revenues continuously flowed into the state budget during 
each fiscal year under the Thaksin government (see section II of this article) and these 
additional revenues were transferred not to line ministries but to the central fund by 
order of the prime minister.  Likewise, expenditures on the 30-baht medical services 
were delivered not to the Ministry of Public Health, but to another independent fund or 
Table 9 Budget Allocation of the “Central Fund,” FY 1991–2011

































1991 39,510 10,240 25.9 7,815 – – – – –
1992 54,443 11,400 20.9 3,830 – – – – –
1993 55,089 13,416 24.4 7,000 – – – – –
1994 61,180 16,129 26.4 11,400 – – – – –
1995 97,389 19,701 20.2 12,200 – – – – –
1996 89,798 24,563 27.4 12,820 – – – – –
1997 85,752 26,168 30.5 12,820 – – – – –
1998 79,081 28,287 35.8 4,491 – – – – –
1999 76,910 28,087 36.5 2,000 – – – – –
2000 76,935 31,750 41.3 – – – – – –
2001 86,912 37,000 42.6 – – – – – –
2002 183,940 45,000 24.5 – 11,650 58,000 – – –
2003 147,633 48,400 32.8 – 12,800 16,600 – – –
2004 265,825 82,040 30.9 – 11,525 – 75,500 – –
2005 250,190 55,000 22.0 – 11,242 – 23,400 15,000 9,400
2006 243,185 60,000 24.7 – 13,035 – – 40,000 19,100
2007 197,650 70,000 35.4 – – – – – –
2008 242,775 73,145 30.1 – – – – – –
2009 240,941 83,480 34.6 – – – – – –
2010 215,007 87,634 40.8 – – – – – –
2011 265,763 96,103 36.2 – – – – – –
Sources: Arranged by the author and Shin’ichi Imaizumi on the basis of “Summary of Expenditure by Ministry 
and Department” in Thailand’s Budget in Brief (BOB, each edition).
Notes: 1) If the initial budget allocation was revised due to additional revenue, the author employed the revised 
figures.
2) Emergency policies for local development include: Rural Employment Generation and Provincial 
Development Programme for FY 1989–92; Rural Employment Creation and Rural Development 
Fund for FY 1992–93; Provincial Development Programmes for FY 1993–94; Tambon Development 
Project for FY 1995–96.
3) Compensation to the government officers include adjustment of salary due to the revision of salary 
tables.
4) For the FY 2002, 58 billion baht was added to the initial allocation as the Economic Resuscitation 
Policy, and which was integrated into the Socio-economic Restructuring Policy in FY 2003.
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“revolving funds.”35)  By employing such techniques, Thaksin could promote his dual-
track policies without any repercussions from ministries as well as economic technocrats.
Mass media frequently attacked such management of budget allocation as an “off-
budget system” or an arbitrary exploitation of state revenue.  But this criticism misses 
the point because Thaksin’s technique does not violate any of the rules of the existing 
budget system.36)  Nevertheless, increasing proportions of the central fund and revolving 
funds are not normal from the standpoint of maintaining sound management of national 
budget.  Accordingly, in 2005, Thaksin ordered the BOB to set up ad hoc committee to 
reconsider and revise the 1959 Act of the Budget in favor of agenda-based budget sys-
tem.37)  But before a new budget could be enacted, Thaksin was ousted from political 
power by the military coup in September 2006.
Result of Thaksin’s State Reforms
As mentioned in the first section of this article, Thaksin had a Janus-faced public image 
as populist and state reformist.  As a populist, he launched a variety of policies in favor 
of the masses.  In fact, according to the pole survey by ABAC, these policies attracted a 
great deal of support from the people: 84% for OTOP, 81% for the 30-baht medical ser-
vices, and 79% for village funds scheme in contrast to 39% for anti-corruption campaign 
and 35% for restructuring of state enterprises (Tamada 2005, 182–183).  Enormous 
popularity coupled with power concentration has resulted in a “strong prime minister.” 
Finally, a strong prime minister, intentionally or unintentionally, suggests another chief 
of state (Pramuk), and therefore a strong competitor to the king.
35) Budget allocation of “30-baht medical services” amounted to 22 billion baht for FY2002, 27 billion 
baht for FY2003, 30 billion baht for FY2004, 36 billion baht for FY2005, and 40 billion baht for 
FY2006, respectively.  After the 2006 coup, the Surayud government decided to reorganize the 
30-baht medical services into a free medical services.  As its result, budget allocation for health 
services in “revolving funds” jumped to 75 billion baht in FY2007 and finally increased to 101 billion 
baht in FY2011 (BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief, each edition).
36) For the case of village funds (77.5 billion baht), the Thaksin government appropriated a total of 60.5 
billion baht from FY2002 to FY2006 in the Central Fund for the particular purpose of debt repayment 
(see Table 9).  This implies that even if the majority of village funds resulted in non-performing 
loans (the worst scenario), the state could still recoup these debts.
37) Contrary to Thaksin’s expectation, the ad hoc committee addressed the basic idea of emphasizing 
the fiscal autonomy of local governments rather than agenda-based budget system, and was reluc-
tant to revise the 1959 Act of the Budget in line with Thaksin’s idea.  Interviews conducted by the 
author with the staffs of the BOB and Nakharin Maektrairat, a member of the ad hoc committee, in 
August 2006, in Bangkok.
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Immediately after the great victory of TRT in 2005 general election, the Nation 
Weekly Magazine carried a special issue headlined “The Second Thaksin Government: 
Next is the Presidency?” (Nation Weekly Magazine 2005).  In the context of Thailand, the 
presidential system is an alternative political form against the monarchy system.  There-
fore, Thaksin’s great victory in the general election was interpreted by a royalist-military 
group as a potential and serious menace to the monarchy system.  At the same time, 
Thaksin’s reform of the budget system at the expense of defense matters has always 
irritated a military group.  In addition, he directly intervened in the top personnel manage-
ment of the military by appointing his cousin in 2003.  These activities finally resulted in 
the counter-balancing activity of a royalist-military coup to oust Thaksin from the power 
in 2006 (Wasana 2008).
On the other hand, Thaksin is an active state reformist.  He promoted various 
reforms to modernize the Kingdom of Thailand: changes in the initiatives of policy 
 making from technocrats to prime minister and TRT; changes in the principle of macro-
economic management from a Five-Year Plan to a state strategy; changes in fiscal base 
of national projects from public debt to own state revenue; changes in the budget system 
from the function-based budget allocation to the agenda-based one; and changes in  public 
sector from traditional bureaucracy to more efficient modern agencies.  More impor-
tantly, his reforms also aimed to change the traditional culture of Thai bureaucracy and 
social values of the Thai people since he wished to develop Thailand into an advanced 
country under global capitalism.
But his style of conducting reforms was too speedy and too radical for the Thai 
people.  In addition, after the landslide victory of TRT in 2005 general election, Thaksin 
began to place more priority on the second track of his dual-track policies such as the 
NCP, the Mega Projects, and modernization of local stock market, which hardly delivered 
direct benefits to most people.  Consequently, the people were disappointed with the 
second Thaksin government policies.  Rather they tend to look at Thaksin’s efforts as 
reforms for his own interest rather than for the people.
At this conjuncture, mass media disclosed that Thaksin had sold all the stocks of his 
family holding in Shin Corporation (telecommunications) to a Singaporean firm in 
exchange of 73.3 billion baht in cash (January 23, 2006).  The Thai mass media immedi-
ately attacked his trade of stocks as an “unfair” move because Thaksin and his family did 
not pay any taxes for their earnings.  At the same time, mass media also condemned 
Thaksin as a traitor to a country because he neglected a national interest (local investors) 
when he decided to sell his stocks.  This incident became the catalyst for the anti-
Thaksin movement among the people, especially among the middle-class in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan area, and it developed into the formation of the People’s Alliance for Democ-
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racy or PAD (so-called yellow shirts group) in February 2006 (Nariphon 2006; Pasuk and 
Baker 2009; Suehiro 2009, Ch. 6).
Thaksin’s reform of the public sector also caused to provoke resistance among 
civil servants.  Strategic Plan of the OPSDC was designed with Western key concepts 
imported from the outside of Thailand.  But these concepts were unfamiliar to lower 
ranked officers who work at public service points.  Furthermore, his reforms were 
inclined to destroy the traditional rules and comfortable culture of Thai bureaucracy such 
as seniority system and quasi-familial relationship.  Civil servants were tired of meeting 
the strict guidelines imposed by the OPSDC.  For these reasons, both the masses and 
the civil servants temporarily welcomed or accepted the military coup to end the Thaksin 
regime despite its apparent annulment of the gains of the democratization movement 
during the 1990s.
My hypothesis can be confirmed by a series of movements of both the National 
Security Council (NSC) consisting of the promoters of military coup and the Surayud 
Julanonda temporary government.  After the military coup, the new government replaced 
the 1997 Constitution with a new constitution in August 2007, which was drafted to 
intentionally exclude the possibility of creating a strong prime minister.  When Surayud 
organized a new cabinet, he appointed most of its members from the ranks of bureaucrats 
and academic circle.  In fact, by the end of May 2007, they include 18 active and retired 
government officials, 8 academics in the universities, 3 military officials, a politician, and 
a NGO activist.  Unlike the Thaksin government (10 out of 36 persons), members 
appointed from business community accounted for a mere 2 out of 33 persons (Suehiro 
2009, 190).  Such distribution of occupational backgrounds suggests the return of Thai 
politics to the traditional management style of the “bureaucratic polity.”
Likewise, the new government restored the authority of the NESDB.  The NESDB 
now neglected Thaksin-initiated state strategies and revised the 10th Five-Year Plan in 
accordance with the king’s philosophy of “sufficiency economy” (setthakit phophiang).  Its 
action plan in July 2007 focused on social stability and public calm rather than economic 
development and modernization of a country.  Along with the revival of bureaucracy, the 
government also restored traditional rule of budget allocation or function-based budget 
system in favor of line ministries, and quickly increased budge for defense matters (See 
Fig. 3).
Budget allocation for defense matters dramatically increased by 35% from 85 billion 
baht (6.3% of the total) in FY2006 to 115 billion baht (7.3%) in FY2007, while the central 
fund decreased by 20% from 243 billion baht (17.9%) to 194 billion baht (12.4%) in cor-
responding years (BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief FY2007).  In FY2008 and FY2009, 
the budget allocation for defense matters continued to increase to 143 billion baht 
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(increase by 24% as compared to the previous fiscal year) and to 168 billion baht (increase 
by 18%), respectively (BOB, Thailand’s Budget in Brief FY2008 and FY2009).  These 
figures suggest the restoration of the military group’s status to the level before the 
Thaksin government (See also Table 7).
All the moves above demonstrate the effort at resetting the situation of Thailand to 
the point just before the advent of the Thaksin regime or the effort to completely destroy 
Thaksinocracy.  In the eyes of the new government, Thaksin is a virus that has invaded 
the computer of Thai society.  Therefore, they had to quarantine the virus first and then 
reset both politics and society to “normal.”  The final step of this reset is a court decision 
to order the dissolution of TRT and the cease of eligibility of 111 TRT executive members 
for election in next five years.  This court decision of May 2007 signals the end of 
 Thaksinocracy and the foreclosure of the possibility of Thaksin’s return to the political 
scene.
However, this resetting work could not eliminate the influence of Thaksin from Thai 
politics.  This is because the new government after the general election under the 2007 
Constitution was transformed from an anti-Thaksin group into a pro-Thaksin group, 
namely, People’s Power Party (PPP).  PPP was led by Samak Sundaravej who openly 
announced that he was willing to serve as the agent of Thaksin Shinawatra.  But Samak 
Fig. 3 Changes in Defense Matters in Budget Allocation, FY1991–2011
Source: Made by the author on the basis of Thailand’s Budget in Brief (BOB, each edition).
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was ousted from the premiership in September 2008, and Somchai Wongsawat, who 
succeeded Samak and Thaksin’s younger brother-in-law, was also forced to resign in 
December according to the orders of the Constitution Court.  Finally, Abhisit Vejjajiva 
of Democrat Party was appointed the 27th prime minister in December 2008 as a result 
of political bargaining among Democrat Party, military group, royalist members, and 
anti-Thaksin groups.
Such a political bargaining without democratic procedures created another political 
conflict between an anti-Thaksin group (a yellow shirts group or PAD and ruling parties) 
and a pro-Thaksin group (a red shirts group or the United Front of Democracy against 
Dictatorship [UDD] and opposition parties) at the end of 2008.38)  In 2010, anti- government 
movement led by UDD has quickly grown up into big rallies due in part to the financial 
support from Thaksin outside Thailand and in part to the economic recession originated 
in a global financial crisis in 2008.  Finally political conflict between UDD and the govern-
ment (the military) developed into a blood-shed incident in May 2010 (Montesano et al. 
2012).
What should be noted here is the fact that the people who came to Bangkok to 
 protest against the Abhisit government not only criticized the double standards of the 
government’s legal treatment of the two groups (anti-Thaksin group and pro-Thaksin 
group), but also began to publicly air their doubts over the current regime of the Thai 
state based on the monarchy or Ammathayathipatai.39)  New developments in the political 
movement in recent years appear to be closely connected to increasing income disparity 
among the people between urban areas and rural areas rather than to poverty in the rural 
areas.  Such increasing income disparity can be attributed not to the fact that Thailand is 
still a developing country but to the fact that Thailand has become a middle-income coun-
try (Suehiro 2009).40)
Generally speaking, it is known that the income gap in terms of the gini index tends 
to expand when a certain country is moving from a lower-income country into a middle-
38) For accounts of the political turmoil in Thailand since 2006, see Funston (2009), Pasuk and Baker 
(2009), Suehiro (2009), and Montesano et al. (2012).
39) “Ammathayathipatai” usually means a bureaucracy.  Since 2009, however, it seems to have implied 
a political regime under the feudal system (Sakdina system) of Thailand in which common people 
(phrai) were forced to be subordinate to the king and high-ranked bureaucrats (ammat).  Red-shirts 
group used the term “wirachon” as their key identical concept (Hero of a country, the key concept 
for the first democratization movement during the 1970s) in 2008 and 2009, but changed it to a 
“phrai” from the year of 2010.
40) In 2010, the World Bank announced that Thailand became a member of middle-income country (a 
country of per capita GNP from USD3,706 to 11,456).  This implies that Thailand successfully 
upgraded her economic status from a developing country to a semi-advanced country.
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income country.  This hypothesis, or a Kuznet’s reverse U-shape curve, is precisely 
adaptable to the case of Thailand.  Indeed, the gini index of Thailand increased from 0.43 
in 1980 to 0.50 in 1987, and further to 0.54 in 1992 (UNDP 2007, 23).41)  It is apparent 
that income distribution has deteriorated during the economic boom.
Crucially, Thaksin is the first prime minister to actually tackle the problems of 
Thailand as a middle-income country.  His state reforms primarily aimed to narrow the 
gap between economic status of Thailand as a middle-income country and old-fashioned 
government agencies to handle economic problems.  He focused on inequality of oppor-
tunity (few business chances in rural areas) rather than inequality of result (poverty in 
rural areas).  Contrary to previous governments, which put priority on poverty reduction, 
Thaksin emphasized the necessity of creating business chances and community busi-
nesses in rural area (village funds, people’s bank, OTOP).  Intentionally or unintention-
ally, his new approach seems to have politically awakened the rural people.  They are 
now focusing their attention on their disadvantaged economic status and the inadequate 
policies adopted by the traditional ruling elites, and further afield on the state regime 
itself.
If this hypothesis is true, then any government will have to face the necessity and 
challenge of solving the various problems facing contemporary Thailand as a middle-
income country, problems such as upgrading of industrial structure, resolving income 
and/or assets disparity in urban and rural areas through creation of jobs and businesses 
opportunities, fundamental reforms of tax system including individual income tax, prop-
erty tax, and inheritance tax (phasi moradok), construction of social security system, 
especially a national pension scheme, and, finally, improvement of public services.
In August 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of Thaksin, became the 
28th prime minister in Thailand after the victory of her political party (Pheu Thai Party) 
in the 2011 general election.42)  Does this political incident provide a new opportunity for 
 Thaksin to return to political arena and create the incentive for a new government to 
revive uncompleted Thaksin’s reforms in Thailand?  My answer is a negative one. 
 Thaksin himself is not a creative destroyer of Thai state anymore.  Now he turns into a 
pure and simple destroyer for Thai society.  New government led by Yingluck also has 
neither intention nor ability of promoting constructive state reforms because they must 
depend heavily on both populist policies and revived bureaucracy.
41) Gini index of Thailand have slightly decreased from 0.43 in 2000 through 0.43 in 2006 to 0.39 in 
2010.  Economic inequality, therefore, has not been improved during the 2000s in comparison to 
rapid decline of poverty population in the same period (Suehiro 2014, Ch.8).
42) Prime Minister Yingluck lost her post by the order of the Constitutional Court on May 7, 2014, and 
the royalist-military group conducted the military coup d’etat again on May 22.
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Nevertheless, state reforms attempted by Thaksin during his administration are still 
needed as long as Thailand wishes to maintain or improve its economic status and develop 
into a more advanced country in the future.  On the other hand, Thai people rejected his 
reforms because these reforms were too speedy and too radical from the standpoint of 
Thai social value (preference of medium).  At the same time, his reforms put priority on 
business interests rather than social justice.  Accordingly, Thailand needs not Thaksin 
himself or another Thaksin, but a new political leader who will be able to harmonize 
modernization of Thai state with the happiness and well-being of the people on the basis 
of Thai social values (Thainess).
Accepted: November 1, 2013
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